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1 Introduction
Both the Department of Justice (DoJ) in the United States (US) and the Commission in
the European Union (EU) have made a top priority of breaking up cartels. This is reflected
in the recent sharp increase in the amount of penalties inflicted on cartel members.1 In
the EU, the record fines of e1,383 million against car glass makers in 2008 is another
illustration: these are the highest penalties the European Commission has ever imposed,
both for an individual company (e896 million on Saint Gobain) and for a cartel as a
whole, beating the e992 million fine against elevator and escalator makers in 2007.
A path-breaking development in the US antitrust policy was the revision of its corpo-
rate leniency program in 1993. Under the old version,2 discretionary leniency was granted
to confessors provided that the cartel was not already under investigation. The new pro-
gram instead automatically guarantees full amnesty to the first firm who blows the whistle
in this case; in addition, some leniency may be granted when an investigation has begun.
Finally, the DoJ added a complementary individual leniency program in 1994 that pro-
tects individual informants from pecuniary fines or criminal sanctions.3 Since its revision
in 1993, the corporate leniency program has been the DoJ’s most effective investigative
tool; it helped to dismantle large global cartels such as the Vitamins or Graphite Elec-
trodes cartels.4 The commonly used argument to explain the success of the US leniency
program is the implementation of first informant rules combined with large expected fines.
This “stick and carrot” logic motivated the recent revisions (2002 and 2006) of the Eu-
ropean leniency program which turns out to be also highly effective in fighting against
cartels.5 In recent years, around two thirds of the successful investigations carried out by
the European Commission have been initiated after one cartel member asked for leniency.
The claimed efficiency of leniency programs has to be taken with caution, however.
First, measuring the direct effect on deterrence is a real challenge since one can only
observe detected cartels. In addition, antitrust authorities tend to overstate their inves-
tigative capabilities and the efficiency of their amnesty schemes. The two previous points
call for both theoretical and empirical research.
1In the US, corporate fines averaged $315 million per year between 1995 and 1999 and $560 million
between 2005 and 2007. In the EU, the rise is impressive, going from e68 million per year between
1995 and 1999 to e1,955 million between 2005 and 2007 (data from the US Antitrust division and the
European Commission). One condition of this surge was the increase in the legal cap. In the US, the
Congress raised in 1990 the maximum fine for Sherman Act violations from $1 million to $10 million.
This statutory limit has been $100 million since 2004. Alternatively, since 1987, fines can be set equal to
twice the convicted firms’ pecuniary gains or twice the victims’ losses. In the EU, firms may be fined up
to 10 % of their turnover.
2The DoJ installed the first corporate leniency program in its antitrust regulation in 1978.
3In the EU, violations of Article 81 and 82 are not punished with criminal fines. In particular,
individuals are not subject to imprisonment.
4The vitamin cartel was cracked in 1999 by the cooperation of the company Rhoˆne-Poulenc SA. The
main co-inspirators Hoffmann-La Roche and BASF paid in the US fines of respectively $500 million and
$225 million while the penalty was waived for Rhoˆne-Poulenc. In the graphite electrodes case (1999), the
cooperative firm played only a secondary role in the cartel but its initial information allows the DoJ to
gather additional evidence that led to the guilty pleas of the other conspirators. In total, firms paid $400
million and three individuals received jail sentences (from 9 to 17 months).
5For a discussion of the differences and similarities between the US and the EU leniency programs,
see Spagnolo’s review (2007).
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While the theoretical literature, starting with Motta and Polo (2003) and Spagnolo
(2004), has confirmed that a well-designed leniency scheme can significantly contribute
to destabilize cartels, it has also pointed out some pro-collusive effects. Concerning de-
terrence effects, Spagnolo (2004) and Rey (2003) note that leniency increases gains from
deviations by allowing defecting cartel members to report and avoid facing the fine. Spag-
nolo (2004) moreover shows that granting the first informant a reward equal to the sum
of the fines imposed on the other conspirators can achieve full deterrence. In parallel,
Aubert, Rey and Kovacic (2006) argue that rewarding individuals also helps to destabi-
lize collusion since firm employees must then be “bribed” to be kept silent. Several papers
however identify perverse effects that may dilute deterrence. Leniency reduces expected
sanctions and thus increases the value of “collude and report” strategies (Motta and Polo
(2003), Spagnolo (2004)). Moreover, badly designed leniency programs may contribute
to stabilize collusion by giving cartel members a tool to punish deviators (Buccirossi and
Spagnolo (2006) in the context of bilateral illegal transactions). Note that restricting
eligibility to the first informant reduces the risk of these two perverse scenarii.
The main obstacle to empirical analysis is that collusive agreements are secret. That
is why the existing recent empirical literature has been obliged to use indirect methods to
assess the impact of leniency programs on cartels behavior (Brenner (2009), Harrington
and Chang (2009), Miller (2009)).6 Harrington and Chang (2009) develop a model of cartel
formation and dissolution which enables to test the efficiency of a new cartel enforcement
tool. In particular, the deterrence effects of leniency may be assessed through the short-
run changes in the duration of discovered cartels. The alternative framework of Miller
(2009) allows to infer changes in the formation rates directly from changes in the number of
detected cartels. He applies his findings to information reports issued by the DoJ between
1985 and 2005 and shows that the pattern of cartel discoveries around the revision in 1993
of the US corporate leniency program is consistent with enhanced cartel detection and
deterrence capabilities. By contrast, Brenner (2009)’s work on European data shows that
the introduction of a leniency policy in Europe in 1996 (without a first informant rule and
full leniency) had no clear effect on deterrence. This suggests that the design of leniency
schemes is a key element of success.
For cartels that are too stable to be deterred, antitrust authorities must try to detect
and crack them down. The recent conviction of the car-glass makers highlights the role
of post-investigation leniency in the prosecution of cartels. According to the European
Commission:
“The Commission started this investigation on its own initiative on the basis of reli-
able information provided by an anonymous informant. The information prompted the
Commission to carry out surprise inspections in 2005 at several sites of car glass producers
in Europe. After the inspections, the Japanese Asahi Glass Co. and its European sub-
sidiary AGC Flat Glass Europe (formerly ’Glaverbel) filed an application under the 2002
Leniency Notice.... Asahi/Glaverbel cooperated fully with the Commission and provided
additional information to help to expose the infringement and its fine was reduced by
6Note that experiments are another means to obtain empirical predictions. See for example Apesteguia
et al. (2007), Bigoni et al. (2008) and Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008).
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50%.”7
We can infer from the Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines (2006) that the
inspections have not been entirely successful since the notice specifies that:
“in order to qualify [for reduction of a fine], an undertaking must provide the Com-
mission with evidence of the alleged infringement which represents significant added value
with respect to the evidence already in the Commission’s possession”.
The period following an investigation is generally a fool’s game. The antitrust au-
thority must convince cartel members that the risk of conviction is real if it wants them
to report their own pieces of information. This pushes the antitrust authority to over-
represent its own evidence and investigative power. In particular, it may run an inves-
tigation against a cartel pretending that conviction is very likely in the hope that firms
will denounce themselves the cartel. We build our model on this idea.
Formally, we consider a standard supergame where firms decide whether to compete
or collude on the market. The Antitrust Authority cannot condemn the cartel without
gathering hard evidence. When firms collude, the Antitrust Authority receives a binary
signal (either good or bad) which determines the probability of convicting cartel members
if an investigation is launched. This probability is low when the signal is bad. As cartel
members do not observe the Antitrust Authority’s signal, they may confess their illegal
activities even when the Antitrust Authority opens an investigation after receiving a bad
signal. In such a case, the cartel is condemned even though the Antitrust Authority was
unlikely to convict firms by its own means.
Our paper is related to Motta and Polo (2003). In their paper, offering leniency enables
the Antitrust Authority to save on prosecution costs, and the freed resources reinforce
detection capabilities. However, the leniency policy gives amnesty to all firms that apply
for leniency, which has a negative impact on cartel deterrence. As a result, the leniency
program is a second-best instrument: if the budget of the Antitrust Authority is large
enough to deter cartel formation, leniency should not be offered. One important innova-
tion in our paper is the incorporation of private information on the Antitrust Authority
side. We shall show that this informational advantage, combined with leniency, allows
the Antitrust Authority to raise the overall conviction rate and thereby to enhance cartel
desistance. The design of the leniency scheme – for instance, implementing or not a first
informant rule – ensures that the increase in the conviction rate also materializes into
higher deterrence.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 provides
a benchmark where there is no information asymmetry between the Antitrust Authority
and cartel members. Section 4 studies the case where the Antitrust Authority has private
information about the strength of its case against a given cartel. Section 5 derives the
optimal informant rule. In section 6, we discuss some policy implications. Finally, section
7 concludes.
7available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/what is new/news.html, reference:
IP/08/1685.
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2 The Model
2.1 Players
2.1.1 Firms
We consider a continuum of industries with unit mass. In each industry, N ≥ 2 symmetric
and risk-neutral firms play an infinitely repeated game. In each period, each firm decides
whether to compete or collude. The gross profit of a firm is:
• ΠC ≥ 0 if firms compete,
• ΠCol > ΠC if firms collude,
• ΠD > ΠCol if the firm deviates from collusion – that is, if it competes when the
other firms collude.
In order to analyze the impact of the antitrust policy on cartel formation, we allow
industries to vary in the scope for collusion by assuming that industries are heterogenous
with respect to ΠD.
We focus on explicit collusion, which is based on communication, meetings and so forth.
We therefore assume that successful collusion automatically generates hard evidence that
the Antitrust Authority needs to find out in order to condemn the cartel. All firms have
the same discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) and maximize the expected discounted sum of their
profits.
We focus on grim trigger strategies in which any deviation from a collusive agreement
is punished by reverting forever to competition, which is here the minmax and thus
constitutes the most severe punishment.
2.1.2 Antitrust Authority (AA)
The AA is aware whether an industry colludes, but cannot condemn a cartel without
gathering hard evidence of collusion. That is, we focus on prosecution rather than on
detection.8 In each period of collusion, the AA receives a binary signal S ∈ {g, b} which
determines the probability of finding hard evidence if it launches an investigation. Con-
ditional on there being a cartel, the probability to receive a good signal is ψ. If the
realization of the signal is good (S = g), the AA knows that it will find hard evidence
of collusion with probability µ < 1 if it runs an investigation. If the realization of the
signal is instead bad (S = b), the AA has no chance to find hard evidence with its own
investigation.9
8The assumption that the AA perfectly observes whether collusion occurs is made for simplicity. Our
results are qualitatively unchanged if we assume instead that the AA receives signals strongly correlated
with the presence of collusion. Our model similarly applies to organized crime (corruption, mafias, drug
trafficking and so on) where prosecution – i.e., finding enough evidence to obtain a condemnation in court
– is a relatively more important issue than detection.
9Section 6 discusses the case where the probability of finding evidence during an investigation is also
positive in case of a bad signal.
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When firms collude, the AA decides whether or not to run an investigation depending
on the realization of the signal. If the AA has gathered hard evidence at the end of the
period, the cartel is condemned and each member must pay a fine F , which is exogenously
set by law.10
Leniency Program. If a leniency program is implemented, eligible firms pay only a
reduced fine if they report information, in which case all cartel members are condemned
with probability one. The AA fixes a pre-investigation leniency rate q0, available before the
beginning of any investigation, and a post-investigation leniency rate q, available during
investigations. We restrict our attention to leniency rates lower than one.11 To facilitate
the exposition of the results, we first constrain the AA to choose between granting leniency
to all informants or instead adopting a first informant rule (denoted hereafter FI rule) –
i.e., to restrict eligibility to the first confessor. Then, in section 5, we expand the set of
feasible schemes by allowing the AA to offer leniency rates contingent on the number of
informants, and we derive in this context the optimal leniency scheme. Finally, following
a condemnation, firms are forced to compete forever.12 Enforcing competition can for
example be achieved through either close monitoring of the industry13 or higher fines for
repeat offenders.14
Information. Except in the benchmark case, the realization of the signal is un-
known to cartel members. The measures of prosecution efficiency ψ and µ, as well as the
parameters of the antitrust scheme q0, q and F are common knowledge.
In practice, the signal S may be obtained during a sector inquiry. According to the
European Commission:
“The Commission may decide to start a sector inquiry when a market does not seem
to be working as well as it should. This might be suggested by evidence such as limited
trade between Member States, lack of new entrants on the market, the rigidity of prices,
or other circumstances suggest that competition may be restricted or distorted within the
common market”.
Alternatively, the realization of the signal may be interpreted as whether the AA re-
10Alternatively, F may be viewed as the maximal punishment allowed by the law. In this case, Becker’s
(1968) argument applies: it is optimal to set fines as high as possible. An infinite fine combined with a
positive, even arbitrarily low enforcement probability necessarily deters cartel formation.
11Well-designed reward schemes are very effective in fighting collusion (see Spagnolo (2004) and Aubert,
Rey and Kovacic (2006)). Authorizing rewards in our setting would also deter collusion in all industries.
However, in practice, it is generally politically unfeasible.
12This assumption is made for simplicity. Our results are qualitatively unchanged if we assume instead
that firms are forced to compete only for a finite positive number of periods following a condemnation.
13In the context of organized crime, imprisonment can also stop an illegal practice.
14Higher fines for repeat offenders are present in US and European antitrust laws.
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ceived some initial incriminating evidence from third parties.15,16 Accordingly, ψ is likely
to vary in practice with the efficiency of existing schemes designed to encourage whistle-
blowing. In particular, sentencing individuals to imprisonment17 or offering bounties18
to informants strongly incentivize third parties’ cooperation.19 The US Amnesty Plus
Program, which gives strong financial incentives to firms already under prosecution for
denouncing cartels in other markets,20 is also an efficient instrument to raise the prob-
ability of obtaining initial evidence on separate cartels.21 As for µ, it is likely to vary
with the AA’s budget, and also with technological progress, for instance the use of digital
forensics.
15Third parties can be internal employees, buyers’ complaints or local agencies. Internal whistleblowing
is encouraged in the US by the Individual Leniency Program. Several recent cases in the US were initiated
by buyers’ complaints such as the graphite electrodes and the stainless steel cartels. Infiltration may
complement individual whistleblowing: a well-known example is the use of covert cameras by the FBI to
tape cartel meetings leading to the conviction of the international Lysine cartel. Note that the recordings
have been facilitated by a cooperating witness. For more detailed information on the prosecution of the
Lysine cartel, see Hammond (2005).
16We could furthermore assume that the initial evidence is more or less reliable, which would justify
the stationarity of the model. Suppose for example that a good signal means that the initial evidence
is reliable with probability ψ, in which case an investigation will be successful for sure, and is otherwise
unreliable, in which case an investigation cannot succeed. If the AA launches an investigation, either the
cartel is condemned and the game thus ends for that industry, or the investigation fails and the AA will
then infer that its initial evidence was not reliable.
17Hammond (2007) declared:
“The Division has long emphasized that the most effective way to deter and punish cartel activity is
to hold culpable individuals accountable by seeking jail sentences”.
The Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004 raised the maximum jail term
available under the Sherman Act from three years to ten years. Nonetheless, the US (and Canada) are
nearly alone in the world in sending cartel managers in jail. The possibility to fine individuals is also
written in the law of other countries (for example Germany, France, Japan) without being applied.
18In practice, very few jurisdictions offer financial rewards for whistleblowers. Notable exceptions are
the UK and South Korea. The UK’s Office of Fair Trading has been offering since March 2008 rewards of
up to £100,000 for information about cartel activity. The Informant Reward System has been introduced
in April 2005 by the Korean Fair Trade Commission and recompenses those who report competition law
violations. In June 2005 a first reward of 66,87 million won (about $ 63,700) was paid to an anonymous
person who provided decisive evidence (names of executive of the 6 cartel members, meeting place and
details of agreements) in a welding rod cartel case. In the US, Kovacic (2001) proposes to expand the
existing Civil False Claims Act (adopted by the Congress in 1863 and reinforced in 1986 which offers
rewards in exchange of information given to the government in procurement fraud cases) to price-fixing
violations.
19Spagnolo (2007) mentions the sociological literature documenting that whistleblowers experience a
terrible working, social and private life after reporting. This suggests that whistleblowing are very unlikely
without high rewards.
20Disclosing a second cartel lead to amnesty for the second offense, together with a substantial reduction
in the fine for the participation in the first cartel.
21Griffin (2003) declared:
“Roughly half of the Division’s current international cartel investigations were initiated by evidence
obtained as a result of an investigation of a completely separate market.”
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2.2 Timing
First, in stage 0, the AA fixes q0 and q at the beginning of the game together with possible
restrictions such as a FI rule. Moreover, it announces and sticks to an investigation policy
(more on this below). Then, in each period, the timing of the game, summarized in Figure
1, is as follows:
• Stage 1. Each firm chooses whether to enter into a collusive agreement. If at least
one firm chooses not to collude, competition takes place and the game moves to the
next period. If all firms choose to enter into a collusive agreement, this decision
leaves hard evidence of collusion and the game proceeds to stage 2.
• Stage 2. Each firm chooses whether to respect the agreement and collude, or to
deviate and compete on the market. These decisions are not observed by the other
firms until the end of the period.
• Stage 3. Each firm decides whether to apply to the pre-investigation leniency pro-
gram and report evidence of collusion to the AA. If at least one firm reports infor-
mation, the cartel is condemned; in that case, eligible firms benefit from a reduced
fine (1− q0)F . Otherwise, the game proceeds to stage 4.
• Stage 4. The AA receives the signal S and decides whether or not to run an investi-
gation. This decision is publicly observed by firms. If the AA runs an investigation,
the game proceeds to stage 5.
• Stage 5. Each firm decides whether to apply to the post-investigation leniency
program. If at least one firm reports, the cartel is condemned; in that case the fine
is reduced to (1− q)F for the eligible firms. Otherwise, the game proceeds to stage
6.
• Stage 6. If the AA received a good signal, it finds hard evidence and can thus
condemn the cartel with probability µ. If the signal is bad, the AA has no chance
to gather evidence of collusion.
Figure 1: The stage game
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2.3 Strategies
We focus on stationary strategies.22
Antitrust Authority. As mentioned above, the investigation policy is contingent
on the realization of the signal. We suppose that µ is large enough to ensure that it is
optimal for the AA to run an investigation with probability one after receiving a good
signal even when firms do not report information.23 When instead the signal is bad, the
AA carries out an investigation with probability σ. Therefore, the investigation policy
boils down to choosing σ, which can be interpreted as the strategy of bluff. We assume
that the AA can credibly commit itself about σ in stage 0, and stick to this investigation
policy afterwards.
When the signal is public, cartel members will not report information if the AA
launches an investigation after having received a bad signal, since they do not face any
risk of conviction. When instead the signal is privately observed by the AA, there is
scope for bluffing – i.e. choosing σ > 0 – as firms may fear that the investigation could
be successful.
Firms. Firms decide whether to compete or collude. Collusion is sustainable if the
expected value of future collusion exceeds the gains from deviating. In case of multiple
sustainable collusive strategies, we assume that firms select the Pareto-dominant collusive
strategy – i.e., the most profitable one.
Let us make some preliminary observations: first, since the investigation policy is sta-
tionary and the fine is independent on the duration of collusion, if collusion is profitable,
then the best collusive strategy consists in colluding in every period until the cartel is
condemned. Second, denouncing the cartel with positive probability before an investiga-
tion cannot be an optimal collusive strategy. If the collusive strategy prescribes to a firm
to report before an investigation, the continuation value of the collusion is zero since the
cartel will be shut down forever. Firms prefer therefore to deviate and compete rather
than collude.24 In contrast, an optimal collusive strategy may prescribe to report in case
of investigation. However, it can be profitable to report only if the leniency rate is posi-
tive. Consequently, if the AA does not offer post-investigation leniency – i.e., if q = 0 –
the most profitable collusive strategy is to “collude and remain silent”. When q > 0, the
optimal reporting strategy is necessarily symmetric since a firm is worse-off being silent
whenever at least one other firm reports; therefore, it suffices to consider two collusive
strategies: “collude and remain silent” and “collude and report in case of investigation”.
In order to be sustainable, these collusive strategies must resist unilateral deviations
on the market. The strategy “collude and remain silent” must moreover be incentive-
22However, it is important to stress that non stationary strategies are theoretically very powerful in
deterring cartels. Frezal (2006) shows that a non-recurrent high probability of conviction better deter
collusion than constant low average controls.
23For lower values of µ, the AA does not open any investigation in the absence of leniency – i.e., we
are in a “Laissez-faire” regime.
24Mixing with private lotteries between reporting and not reporting before an investigation also requires
the continuation value of the collusion to be zero, and firms prefer again to deviate and compete. Mixing
with public lotteries could be sustainable, but collude and not report before an investigation is then a
fortiori sustainable and more profitable.
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compatible, that is, robust to unilateral reporting deviations: no firm should gain by
reporting in case of investigation when the other firms remain silent. Therefore, firms
choose to “collude and remain silent” instead of “collude and report in case of investiga-
tion” only if it is both more profitable and incentive-compatible.
Let us denote by γ, the probability that at least one firm reports information in case
of investigation,25 by φ, the conviction rate faced by firms when they collude and by
V (σ, γ, q), the value of collusion.
When firms collude in an industry, the AA runs an investigation with probability
ψ + (1 − ψ)σ. Either at least one firm reports, in which case the cartel is condemned
with certainty, or no firm reports and the cartel is condemned only if the investigation is
successful – i.e. with probability ψµ. Therefore, φ is:
φ(σ, γ) = (ψ + (1− ψ)σ)γ + ψ(1− γ)µ
φ(., .) is strictly increasing in γ, increasing in σ (strictly if γ > 0) and lies between φ(0, 0) =
ψµ and φ(1, 1) = 1. Because firms are forced to compete once condemned, it follows that
the value of collusion solves V = ΠCol +φ(σ, γ)( δΠ
C
1−δ − (1− q)F ) + (1−φ(σ, γ))δV , that is:
V (σ, γ, q) =
ΠCol + φ(σ, γ)( δΠ
C
1−δ − (1− q)F )
1− δ(1− φ(σ, γ))
Lemma 1. V (σ, γ, q) is (i) strictly decreasing in γ, (ii) decreasing in σ (strictly so for
γ > 0) and (iii) strictly increasing in q.
Proof. See Appendix.
Let us denote by VD, the value of the optimal deviating strategy. If one firm deviates,
it obtains ΠD > ΠCol but its continuation profit is δΠ
C
1−δ since it will be punished by
reversal to the minmax. As a deviating firm still faces a fine, the strategy “deviate on
the market and simultaneously report pre-investigation” constitutes the optimal strategy
if q0 > 1 − φ(σ, γ). Since rewards are forbidden, offering full amnesty in case of pre-
investigation reports is then always optimal (q0 = 1), as this maximizes the incentives to
deviate. The optimal deviating strategy has then value VD = Π
D + δΠ
C
1−δ . Observe that
restricting pre-investigation leniency to the first informant has no impact here. In the
literature, limiting leniency to the first confessor prevents collusive firms from reporting
in each period in order to protect themselves from fines (Spagnolo (2004), Chen and Rey
(2007)). In our model, however, firms are forced to compete once condemned, which de
facto deter firms from colluding and reporting information in each period.
25As already mentioned, cartel members will either all report or all remain silent in case of investigation
– i.e., either γ = 1 or γ = 0.
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2.4 Welfare
The AA is benevolent and maximizes total welfare,26 or equivalently minimizes the social
cost of collusion. Society incurs a per-period deadweight loss L > 0 when firms collude.
For notational convenience, the society has the same discount factor δ as firms. The cost
of carrying out an investigation is c ≥ 0.
Firms collude in an industry if VD ≤ V (σ, γ, q).27 Gains from deviating are dis-
tributed across industries according to the cumulative distribution function G. Hence,
G(V (σ, γ, q)) denotes the initial proportion of collusive industries in the economy. We are
now able to write the social cost of collusion in the economy, C, which is such that:
C = G(V (σ, γ, q))Cˆ
where Cˆ denotes the social cost of a cartel, when it is formed, and is such that:
Cˆ = L+ (ψ + (1− ψ)σ)c+ δ(1− φ(σ, γ))Cˆ
and thus:
Cˆ = Cˆ(σ, γ) ≡ L+ (ψ + (1− ψ)σ)c
1− δ(1− φ(σ, γ))
When firms collude, society incurs the loss L. The AA opens an investigation with
probability ψ+(1−ψ)σ, which allows to convict cartel members with probability φ(σ, γ).
When condemned, firms are forced to compete which is the efficient social market behav-
ior. Otherwise, society incurs the social cost of the cartel the following period.
An antitrust policy has a positive effect on cartel deterrence if it reduces the proportion
of collusive industries. It has a positive effect on cartel desistance if it reduces the social
cost of a cartel (denoted by Cˆ).
3 Optimal Policy under Transparent Procedures
We proceed by backward induction. First, we determine, depending on the antitrust
policy, whether firms choose to “collude and report in case of investigation”, to “collude
and be silent” or to compete. Then, we infer the optimal antitrust policy.
As already mentioned, when cartel members observe the AA’s signal, they will never
report if the AA receives a bad signal and thus the AA will never open an investigation
in that case – i.e., σ=0. In contrast, cartel members may want to apply for leniency when
the AA opens an investigation after receiving a good signal, since they do face a risk of
being condemned. They are more likely to do so when (i) the risk of conviction µ (“the
stick”) is high; and: (ii) the leniency rate q (“the carrot”) is high.
26We treat the fine as a transfer from the firms to the AA which thus does not affect welfare. The
collected fines could however enter the objective function when the AA faces a budget constraint. The
European Commission indeed argues that the penalties paid go to the Community budget and, therefore,
contribute to finance the European Union.
27We implicitly assume here that collusion arises whenever it is sustainable, although competition
remains an equilibrium even when collusion is sustainable.
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“Collude and report in case of investigation” (R). When the AA runs an
investigation after receiving a good signal and firms report, the cartel is condemned with
probability 1 and not only with probability µ. From an ex ante perspective, the (expected)
conviction rate is therefore φ(0, 1) = ψ, the AA’s probability to receive a good signal.
If leniency is granted to all informants, each collusive firm pays the reduced fine (1 −
q)F when convicted. Therefore, the value of the collusion, V RB (where B stands for
Benchmark), equals:
V RB (q) = V (0, 1, q) =
ΠCol + φ(0, 1)( δΠ
C
1−δ − (1− q)F )
1− δ(1− φ(0, 1))
If instead leniency is granted only to the first informant (FI rule), the leniency rate
faced by each firm is q
N
, and the value of the collusion, V RB,FI(q), equals V
R
B (
q
N
).
“Collude and be silent” (S). If all firms choose to remain silent when the AA
carries out an investigation, the value of collusion, V S, is:
V S = V (0, 0, q) =
ΠCol + φ(0, 0)( δΠ
C
1−δ − F )
1− δ(1− φ(0, 0))
The cartel is dismantled only if the AA after receiving a good signal succeeds in
finding out hard evidence of collusion during the investigation. The conviction rate is
then φ(0, 0) = ψµ. When convicted, firms pay the full fine F . As already mentioned, the
collusive path “collude and be silent” faces an incentive-compatibility (ICB) constraint:
no firm should gain by instead reporting information when an investigation is ongoing –
which is the case if:
µ(
δΠC
1− δ − F ) + (1− µ)δV
S ≥ δΠ
C
1− δ − (1− q)F (ICB)
If firms stick to the path “collude and be silent”, either the investigation is successful
with probability µ in which case cartel members must pay F and are forced to compete
on the market or the investigation fails with probability (1 − µ) and cartel members’
discounted continuation payoffs are δV S. If instead one firm betrays the cartel by uni-
laterally deciding to report, it pays only a reduced fine (1− q)F . This is independent on
whether the AA implements or not a FI rule.
As already mentioned, firms choose to “collude and be silent” instead of “collude and
report in case of investigation” only if it is both incentive-compatible and more profitable.
Lemma 2 derives the firms’ decisions in function of the AA’s leniency policy.
Lemma 2. There exists a threshold, qµ ≡ (1 − µ) δ(ΠCol−ΠC)+(1−δ)F(1−δ)F+µψδF , such that, provided
that collusion is sustainable:
for q < qµ, firms collude and remain silent;
for q > qµ, firms collude and report in case of investigation;
for q = qµ, firms are indifferent between the two collusive strategies when leniency is
granted to all informants. Under a FI rule, firms collude and remain silent.
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Proof. If leniency is granted to all informants, firms choose to “collude and be silent” instead of “collude
and report in case of investigation” if and only if V S > V RB (q) and the (ICB) constraint is satisfied. If
the AA adopts a FI rule, firms choose to “collude and be silent” instead of “collude and report in case of
investigation” if and only if V S > V RB,FI(q) and the (ICB) constraint is satisfied.
First, let us show that the (ICB) constraint is equivalent to V
S ≥ V RB (q). Let us multiply by ψ and
add ΠCol on both sides of the (ICB) constraint. We obtain:
ΠCol + ψµ(
δΠC
1− δ − F ) + ψ(1− µ)δV
S ≥ ΠCol + ψ( δΠ
C
1− δ − (1− q)F )
Because V S = ΠCol + ψµ( δΠ
C
1−δ − F ) + (1− ψµ)δV S , it follows that the (ICB) constraint is equivalent to
(1− δ(1− ψ))V S ≥ ΠCol + ψ( δΠC1−δ − (1− q)F ), and thus to V S ≥ V RB (q). Second, simple computations
show that V S ≥ V RB (q) if and only if q ≤ qµ. Third, observe that V RB (q) ≥ V RB,FI(q) (strictly so for
q > 0).
It follows that if q > qµ, the (ICB) constraint is not satisfied and cartel members choose to report
in case of investigation (with or without a FI rule). If q < qµ, V
S > V RB ≥ V RB,FI(q): since (S) is
incentive-compatible and more profitable than (R) (with or without a FI rule), cartel members choose to
collude and be silent. Finally, if q = qµ, (S) is incentive-compatible, V
S = V RB (q) > V
R
B,FI(q) and thus if
leniency is granted to all informants, cartel members are indifferent between the two collusive strategies.
Under a FI rule, firms collude and remain silent.
qµ is lower than 1 if µ is higher than a threshold µ < 1. Figure 2(a) represents the
conviction rate and Figure 2(b) the equilibrium value of collusion in function of q for the
case µ > µ.28
(a) Conviction rate. (b) Equilibrium value of collusion under a FI
rule.
Figure 2: Benchmark
28On Figure 2(b), V RB,FI(1) is either below or above V
S .
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The optimal antitrust policy consists in choosing the leniency rate q and the informant
rule (either the all informant or the FI rule) which minimize the social cost of collusion
C.
Desistance. Cartel desistance is enhanced when firms report information, since in
that case, conviction is obtained for sure during an investigation instead of being uncer-
tain. The AA has to set the leniency rate above qµ in order to force cartel members to
report in case of investigation. When µ < µ, it is however impossible to induce reporting
if rewards are ruled out (i.e., if q ≤ 1).29 For the rest of the paper, we assume µ ≥ µ. In-
troducing a leniency rate q > qµ suffices to optimize desistance,
30 and raises the conviction
rate from φ(0, 0) to φ(0, 1).
Deterrence. We mentioned that restricting pre-investigation leniency to the first
informant has no impact in our model. This is not true for post-investigation leniency.
When q > qµ, a FI rule reduces the profitability of “collude and report in case of inves-
tigation” strategies from V RB (q) to V
R
B,FI(q) and therefore it should be preferred to an all
informant rule. When leniency is given to all informants, firms report information only
if it is profitable for the cartel as a whole to do so ((R) is played instead of (S) only if
V RB (q) > V
S). By introducing a FI rule, the AA targets the fundamental weakness of the
cartel, namely its internal cohesion. As a result, there is a discontinuity in the value of
the collusion around qµ: for q˜ just above qµ, cartel members would be collectively better
off by all remaining silent (V S > V RB,FI(q˜)). However, in that case, each firm is willing to
betray the cartel by reporting when the other firms remain silent (V RB (q˜) > V
S). (S) is
therefore not incentive-compatible and firms are forced to play a less profitable collusive
strategy, namely (R).
The value of the collusion is minimized when the AA implements a FI rule and sets
q just above qµ (see Figure 2(b)). Offering more leniency is pro-collusive: this reduces
expected sanctions without increasing any further the conviction rate, which mechanically
raises the value of collusion.
Choosing q just above qµ and implementing a FI rule optimize both cartel desistance
and cartel deterrence and thus form the optimal antitrust policy. Proposition 1 summa-
rizes the analysis:
Proposition 1 (Public signals). Leniency policy. The optimal leniency rate q∗ is just
above qµ.
Welfare. Introducing post-investigation leniency is desirable both from a deterrence
and a desistance perspective. The initial proportion of collusive industries drops from
G(V S) to G(V RB,FI(q
∗)) under a FI rule and the conviction rate increases from φ(0, 0) to
φ(0, 1).
29Obviously if rewards were allowed, reporting could be induced for any value of µ.
30Formally, optimizing desistance in the benchmark requires to minimize Cˆ(0, γ). As Cˆ(0, γ) is de-
creasing in γ, desistance is optimized when cartel members report information in case of an investigation.
A corollary is that the choice of the informant rule plays no role from a desistance perspective.
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4 Optimal Policy under Prosecutorial Discretion
Suppose now that firms do not observe the signal of the AA. When the signal is bad,
the AA has no chance to condemn the cartel through its own investigations. Still, the
AA may want to run an investigation in the hope that cartel members will denounce
themselves the cartel.
As before, we proceed by backward induction and characterize the optimal antitrust
policy when the AA can commit itself to a pre-specified investigation policy σ. If cartel
members report in case of an investigation, “bluffing” – that is, choosing σ > 0 – enhances
both cartel desistance and cartel deterrence. However, increasing σ has a shadow cost:
it dilutes the risk of conviction if cartel members remain silent. By Bayes rule, the
probability of prosecutorial success in case of an investigation equals ψµ
ψ+(1−ψ)σ , which is
decreasing in σ. As we will see, because of this dilution effect, the optimal investigation
policy σ∗ is interior, so as to keep inducing cartel members to report.
“Collude and report in case of investigation” (R). When firms do not observe
the AA’s signal and report in case of investigation, they are condemned even when the
AA received a bad signal. The conviction rate is therefore φ(σ, 1) = ψ + (1 − ψ)σ. If
leniency is granted to all informants, the value of the collusion, V R(σ, q), is then:
V R(σ, q) = V (σ, 1, q) =
ΠCol + φ(σ, 1)( δΠ
C
1−δ − (1− q)F )
1− δ(1− φ(σ, 1))
If instead the AA implements a FI rule, the value of collusion, V RFI(σ, q), equals
V R(σ, q
N
).
“Collude and be silent” (S). The value of the collusion remains V S because the
AA can find hard evidence only after receiving a good signal. (S) is again subject to an
incentive-compatibility (IC) constraint: no firm should be willing to betray the cartel by
reporting during an investigation, which is the case if:
(1− ψµ
ψ + (1− ψ)σ )δV
S +
ψµ
ψ + (1− ψ)σ (
δΠC
1− δ − F ) ≥
δΠC
1− δ − (1− q)F (IC)
The (IC) constraint is equivalent to:31
V S ≥ V R(σ, q)
For q ≤ qµ, V S ≥ V R(0, q) and thus cartel members do not report information in the
absence of bluff (see the benchmark case). As V R(σ, q) is decreasing in σ, they will not
report a fortiori when the AA chooses σ > 0.
Suppose now that q > qµ. In that case, V
R(0, q) is higher than V S. Observe also that
V R(1, q) = ΠCol + δΠ
C
1−δ − (1 − q)F , which is lower than V D = ΠD + δΠ
C
1−δ , and thus we
have V R(1, q) < V S when V S ≥ V D. We focus on the case V S ≥ V D since for V S < V D,
collusion is deterred even in the absence of post-investigation leniency. As V R(σ, q) is
31To show the equivalence, it suffices to follow the same computations done in lemma 2.
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decreasing in σ, for q > qµ, it follows that there exists a threshold σ
∗(q) ∈ (0, 1) such
that V S = V R(σ∗(q), q). For σ < σ∗(q), V S < V R(σ, q) and thus (S) is not incentive-
compatible. For σ ≥ σ∗(q), cartel members remain silent as (S) is incentive-compatible
and more profitable than (R) (with or without a FI rule since V S ≥ V R(σ, q) implies
V S > V RFI(σ, q)).
32 Lemma 3 summarizes our analysis.
Lemma 3. Provided that collusion is sustainable,
for q ≤ qµ, ∀σ, firms collude and remain silent;
for q > qµ,
if σ < σ∗(q), firms collude and report in case of investigation;
if σ > σ∗(q), firms collude and remain silent;
if σ = σ∗(q), firms are indifferent between the two collusive strategies when leniency
is granted to all informants. Under a FI rule, firms collude and remain silent.
Figure 3(a) represents the conviction rate and Figure 3(b) the equilibrium value of
collusion as a function of σ when q > qµ.
33
(a) Conviction rate. (b) Equilibrium value of collusion under a FI
rule.
Figure 3
The optimal antitrust policy consists in choosing the leniency rate q, the informant
rule (all informant or FI rule) and the investigation policy σ which minimize the social
cost of collusion C.
Desistance. Formally, optimizing desistance requires to minimize Cˆ(σ, γ), where γ
equals either 0 or 1. It is easy to show that Cˆ(σ, 0) is increasing in σ, and Cˆ(σ, 1) is
32To be more precise, when σ = σ∗(q) and leniency is granted to all informants, cartel members are
indifferent between “collude and report in case of investigation” and “collude and remain silent”.
33On Figure 3(b), V RFI(0, q) is either below or above V
S .
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decreasing in σ.34 Moreover, Cˆ(0, 1) < Cˆ(0, 0). Therefore, ∀ σ and σ˜, Cˆ(σ, 1) < Cˆ(σ˜, 0).
It follows that optimizing desistance boils down to ensure that cartel members report in
case of investigation (γ = 1), and to maximize σ under this constraint.
For q ≤ qµ, cartel members remain silent in case of investigation (see Lemma 3) and
therefore, Cˆ is minimized for σ = 0.
For q > qµ, cartel members report in case of investigation only if σ < σ
∗(q) (see
Lemma 3) and thus, desistance is optimized when the AA chooses σ just below σ∗(q).
Intuitively, if the AA chooses σ low enough – i.e., below the threshold σ∗(q) – it is likely
to have received a good signal when it launches an investigation, consequently firms prefer
to report. In contrast, when the AA chooses σ above σ∗(q), the risk of conviction is too
low to induce firms to denounce the cartel. Firms report information only if they perceive
a significant risk than the AA will condemn them in case of an investigation; by bluffing,
the AA dilutes this risk, possibly to the point of discouraging leniency applications.
Optimizing desistance turns out to be equivalent to maximizing the conviction rate (see
Figure 3(a)). If the AA chooses σ above σ∗(q), firms remain silent during investigations
and the conviction rate drops to φ(0, 0). Therefore, the AA is better off by choosing σ = 0
(as in the benchmark case) than choosing σ above σ∗(q). Opening investigations too
frequently after receiving bad signals penalizes desistance because it creates a negative
externality on the efficiency of investigations launched after receiving good signals by
discouraging cartel members from reporting information.35
Deterrence. The increase in the conviction rate is also beneficial in terms of deter-
rence. When the AA adopts a FI rule, for σ just below σ∗(q), cartel members would be
collectively better off by remaining silent in case of investigation. However, this is again
not incentive-compatible and thus cartel members are forced to report, which materializes
ex ante into a lower (expected) value of collusion (see Figure 3(b)).
The following proposition characterizes the optimal cartel policy.
Proposition 2 (Private signals). Leniency policy. It is optimal to grant full amnesty
(q = 1).
Investigation policy. The optimal investigation policy is to fix σ just below σ∗(1).
Welfare. Bluffing is welfare-enhancing. The initial proportion of collusive industries,
here equal to G(V RFI(σ
∗(1), 1)) under a FI rule, is lower and the conviction rate, here equal
to φ(σ∗(1), 1), is higher compared to the benchmark.
Proof. See Appendix.
Increasing the leniency rate allows the AA to open more investigations while still
ensuring that firms report, which enhances desistance (σ∗(q) is increasing in q). Deterrence
is simultaneously improved because the value of the collusion V RFI(σ
∗(q), q) is decreasing
34For Cˆ(σ, 1) to be decreasing in σ, we have to assume that c < δL1−δ – i.e., the social gain of condemning
an existing cartel outweighs the cost of an investigation.
35It is also harmful because the AA pays the cost c when it opens an investigation with a bad signal
without any benefit since cartel members do not report. Observe also that it is not optimal to open an
investigation in every period even in the case where c = 0 – that is, when an investigation is costless.
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in q. Intuitively, the increase in the conviction rate outweighs the pro-collusive effect of
offering more leniency when the AA adopts a FI rule.36 The leniency policy not only
triggers applications as in the benchmark case but it also gives more room for bluffing.
This second effect explains why full amnesty is optimal here.37
Proposition 3 (Comparative statics). Changes in the parameters have the following
effects on the probability of bluff and on welfare:
Increase in Effect on
Probability of bluff Welfare
σ∗(1)
Private gain from collusion, ΠCol −ΠC Lower Lower
Social loss from collusion, L No effect Lower
Fine, F Higher Higher
Probability to have initial evidence, ψ Higher Higher
Efficiency of investigations, µ Higher Higher
As usual, a higher stake of collusion tilts the balance in favor of the cartel and makes
prosecution more difficult. In contrast, a more generous carrot (i.e., a higher q) or a
harsher stick (i.e., a higher fine F , a higher µ or a higher ψ) reinforces firms’ incentives
to betray the cartel. In our setting, this enables the AA to raise the probability of bluff,
which has a positive effect on welfare.38
Comparative statics with respect to ψ confirm the complementary role of individual
leniency programs and whistleblowing schemes. Firms are more prone to report when the
AA is more likely to be informed by third parties about their illegal activities.
5 The Single Informant rule
The AA can do better than implementing a FI rule. Intuitively, an optimal informant rule
should destabilize the collusive path (S) while minimizing the reduction in fines imposed
on cartel members.
Let us allow the leniency rate to be fully flexible with respect to the number of
informants. A leniency scheme is a N -tuple Q = (q1, . . . , qN) where ql ∈ [0, 1] for
l ∈ {1, . . . , N}; if the AA receives l leniency applications, each informant is eligible to
the leniency rate ql. Offering the leniency rate q to all informants is equivalent to the
36When leniency is granted to all informants, both effects exactly compensate each other. Formally,
V R(σ∗(q), q) is constant in q and equals V S .
37Again, rewards would raise further the probability of bluff which is desirable both in terms of desis-
tance and deterrence. In particular, if the AA offers the reward q˜ > 1 such that σ∗(q˜) = 1, it can bluff
with probability one while still ensuring that cartel members report. When the leniency scheme is well-
designed, rewards guarantee that collusion is deterred at no cost in all industries. Observe that deterrence
here is based on post-investigation rewards whereas Spagnolo (2004)’s result rests on pre-investigation
rewards (VD can be made arbitrarily large by offering rewards).
38A lower ΠCol −ΠC , a higher F or a higher ψ, by directly decreasing the value of collusion, have also
a trivial positive effect on welfare.
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leniency scheme (q, . . . , q) whereas adopting a FI rule boils down to offer the leniency
scheme (q, q
2
, . . . , q
N
).
The (IC) constraint rewrites V S ≥ V R(σ, q1). It is easy to see that the optimal
leniency scheme imposes q∗1 = 1 and q
∗
N arbitrarily close to 0;
39 q∗1 maximizes the internal
conflict of interest between cartel members (formally, this tightens the (IC) constraint)
and q∗N minimizes the value of the “collude and report in case of investigation” strategy.
The optimal leniency scheme involves a single informant rule (denoted hereafter SI rule),
that is, amnesty should be given only if a unique cartel member reports information.
When the AA adopts a SI rule, it wins on both counts: firms are forced to play
(R) ((S) is not robust to single reporting deviations when the AA sticks to σ just below
σ∗(1) and offers q∗1 = 1) and they end up paying the full fine. It follows that choosing
to implement a SI rule instead of a FI rule enhances deterrence (both rules have the
same effect in terms of desistance). The initial proportion of collusive industries drops to
G(V (σ∗(1), 1, 0)) < G(V RFI(σ
∗(1), 1)).40
The following table describes the optimal leniency scheme and welfare when the AA
is allowed to adopt the SI rule.
No post-investigation Post-investigation leniency
leniency
Public signals Private signals
(benchmark)
Optimal leniency rate Immaterial Any q above qµ q = 1
Optimal informant rule Immaterial SI rule SI rule
Deterrence V (0, 0, 0) > V (0, 1, 0) > V (σ∗(1), 1, 0)
Desistance (conviction rate) φ(0, 0) < φ(0, 1) < φ(σ∗(1), 1)
Here, desistance and deterrence objectives are aligned, a main difference with Motta
and Polo (2003) where the leniency policy enhances desistance but harms deterrence.
6 Policy Implications
We discuss here some policy implications of our model.
Real world leniency policy. In the benchmark case, when the AA implements a
FI rule, the optimal leniency rate tends to zero if µ tends to one (see Lemma 2). Offering
leniency in this case would be pro-collusive. This is the standard argument for refusing to
39q∗N must be positive to ensure that reporting is a (strictly) dominant strategy. Observe that the
optimal leniency scheme also requires q∗l to be arbitrarily close to 0 for l ∈ {2, . . . , N − 1} when the
number of cartel members is initially unknown. Therefore, when at least two cartel members report, the
effective reduction in the fine is arbitrarily close to 0. In order to facilitate the exposition, we assume it
is equal to 0.
40The SI rule also outperforms the FI rule in the benchmark. The initial proportion of collusive
industries equals G(V (0, 1, 0)) under the SI rule and G(V (0, 1, qµ)) under the FI rule. Observe also that
if the AA implements a SI rule, any q strictly above qµ is optimal.
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grant leniency when the probability to win the case in the absence of firms’ confessions is
already very large. This recommendation is implemented by antitrust authorities in the
US and in Europe. Section B of the Corporate Leniency Policy grants post-investigation
leniency to the first informant provided that the DoJ,
“at the time the corporation comes in, does not yet have evidence against the company
that is likely to result in a sustainable conviction”.
Similarly, the latest (European) Commission Notice (2006) on immunity from fines
specifies that:
“In order to qualify [for reduction of a fine], an undertaking must provide the Com-
mission with evidence of the alleged infringement which represents significant added value
with respect to the evidence already in the Commission’s possession”.
Our analysis challenges this common view that leniency is necessarily pro-collusive
when the risk of conviction is large. First, note that in the benchmark, if the AA imple-
ments a SI rule instead of a FI rule, offering full amnesty does not dilute deterrence even
if µ is close to one. Again, this stresses that the design of the eligibility rules is crucial in
determining the deterrence effect of leniency.
More importantly, and contrary to what the above motion suggests, it is optimal to
maintain q = 1 even when µ is large, so as to implement the investigation policy σ∗(1).
Cartel members’ beliefs about the AA’s ability to prosecute cartels. An-
titrust authorities publicize their successes. One rationale is to induce cartel members to
apply for leniency and to deter potential ones from forming new cartels.41 Indeed, what
matters is the firms’ beliefs about prosecution efficiency (reflected here by ψ and µ) rather
than its actual value. The importance of these beliefs has already been emphasized by
the literature. Harrington (2006) for instance argues that:
“What can the antitrust authority do to move beliefs in this direction? It can advertise
- remind firms that the antitrust authority is watching, that fellow cartel members may use
the leniency program, that the antitrust authority has caught price-fixers. The antitrust
authority can appear at trade association meetings, continually remind managers about
the corporate leniency program, and advertise the programs successes.”
The concern of pushing firms’ beliefs upwards is also transparent in the rhetoric of
antitrust authorities. Hammond (2001) declares:
“It is a far riskier proposition today to roll the dice and choose not to report antitrust
wrongdoing than it used to be. The Division simply has more investigative tools in its
41Antitrust authorities insist on the important role of reporting past condemnations. Hammond (2004)
claims that:
“[Of course], cultivating a fear of detection requires that an authority has a demonstrated track record
of detecting cartels.”
In the same vein, Barnett (2006) advocates that:
”antitrust enforcers should publicize their anti-cartel efforts in order to maximize deterrence”.
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arsenal than ever before. Our ability to discover and investigate antitrust offenses has dra-
matically improved based on a number of developments, including: (1) the high incidence
of self reporting by amnesty applicants, as well as early cooperation from companies and
individuals, even when amnesty is no longer available; (2) the Division’s highly successful
proactive use of amnesty, referred to as ”Amnesty Plus,” complemented by its proactive
efforts to profile markets where cartel activity may be ongoing; and (3) the increased
enforcement efforts and assistance provided by foreign antitrust authorities.”
Our model highlights one potential advantage of moving firms’ beliefs upwards. Sup-
pose one firm believes that the AA receives a good signal with probability ψ
′
> ψ instead
of the actual prior ψ.42 This could be due to AA’s publicity, risk-aversion, or agency
frictions.43 Provided it is aware about it, the AA can raise the probability of bluff which
enhances cartel desistance and deterrence. Note that it is enough to fool only a single
firm about the risk of conviction in order to destabilize the cartel as a whole.
Finally, observe that a leniency policy can be useful in trying to fool firms about the
actual risk of conviction, as it makes it more difficult to learn the efficiency of the AA’s
prosecution. Indeed, when one cartel member reports, other firms are not able to revise
their beliefs about the underlying conviction rate, i.e. the probability of prosecutorial
success in the absence of confessions.
Miscoordination among cartel members. By assuming that cartel members can
coordinate themselves on the Pareto-dominant collusive path, we have chosen the equi-
librium selection which is the most “favorable” to firms, and by the same token, the
most “detrimental” to the AA. Even in this case, we have shown that bluffing is welfare-
enhancing. If instead cartel members cannot perfectly coordinate their reporting decisions,
the AA could raise the investigation policy σ above σ∗(1) and still obtain confessions. In
particular, when one firm believes that at least one other firm will apply for leniency, it
reports information even when the AA chooses the investigation policy σ = 1.
Positive risk of conviction in case of a bad signal. Until now, we have assumed
that the AA has no chance to find evidence when it opens an investigation after receiving
a bad signal. Suppose instead that in such a case, the AA can find hard evidence with
probability µL > 0, and let us focus on the interesting case where the AA wants to open
an investigation after receiving a bad signal even if cartel members choose not to report.44
It follows that in the absence of leniency, when there is a cartel in an industry, the AA
opens an investigation in every period.
When the signal is private information, the AA is actually better off lowering the
probability to open an investigation in case of a bad signal, in order to induce cartel
42The same is true with respect to firms’ beliefs about µ.
43The firm may fear than its employees are more likely to be informed about collusive practices and to
whistle blow.
44A sufficient condition is that c < µL
δL
1−δ . Opening an investigation after receiving a bad signal costs
c and allows to find hard evidence with probability µL; the (discounted) gain for dismantling the cartel
is δL1−δ . This is a sufficient but not a necessary condition as it does not take into account the positive
effect of opening an investigation on cartel deterrence.
21
members to report information. Perhaps surprisingly, in that case the introduction of
leniency – i.e., moving from no leniency to the optimal leniency scheme under prosecutorial
discretion – raises the overall conviction rate and thus welfare but lowers the number of
cartel cases, even in the short run.45
From an empirical perspective, an important corollary is that antitrust activity is not
necessarily a good proxy for assessing the efficiency of the antitrust policy: our analysis
shows that a drop in the number of cartel cases around the introduction of leniency may
well correspond to an improvement of cartel policies.
Ex-post transparency as a commitment device. We assumed that the AA
can commit to a given investigation policy. A potential tool to credibly commit is ex
post transparency. In our case, the AA should report cartel cases where it refrained from
opening (or postponed) an investigation due to the insufficiency of initial evidence against
the cartel.46
Single Informant Rule. Spagnolo (2007) discusses the objective of an optimal
leniency program:
“This means that a well-designed program must maximize incentives to betray the
cartel by reporting important information to the Antitrust Authority, while at the same
time limiting as much as possible the reduction in fines imposed on the whole cartel. This
objective can be achieved by maximizing the benefits an individual cartel member can
receive from reporting under the leniency program, but restricting such maximal benefit
to one and only one reporting party, the first comer.”
We fully agree with the diagnosis. However, our analysis challenges the optimal re-
sponse: in order to minimize the reduction in fines imposed on the whole cartel, the SI
rule outperforms the FI rule.
Observe that implementing the SI rule in the real-world would require (i) to offer
leniency only during a limited duration and (ii) to enforce the privacy of leniency appli-
cations over this period. Note also that the success of the SI rule rests on the assumption
that cartel members are forced to compete forever once condemned. When instead firms
go on colluding after being condemned, the SI rule is equivalent to the FI rule: in both
cases, when firms choose the collusive path “collude and report in every period”, they will
take turns for reporting and obtaining leniency.
7 Conclusive Remarks
The literature on leniency programs does not consider private information on the AA
side. We have shown that taking it into account has important implications for leniency
policies.
45That is, abstracting from the deterrence effect of leniency which also goes in the direction of reducing
the number of cartel cases.
46Observe that firms can statistically infer the investigation policy of the AA directly from the number
of cartel cases when they know ψ and the distribution of ΠD.
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When it is privately informed about the strength of the case against a cartel, the AA
may obtain confessions even when it opens an investigation knowing that it is unlikely
to find hard evidence. However, the AA should carefully choose its investigation policy
as opening investigations when the probability of prosecutorial success is low dilutes the
average risk of conviction faced by cartel members and therefore lowers the likelihood
of leniency applications. In this context, offering more leniency is desirable because it
counterbalances the dilution in the risk of conviction, and thus allows the AA to open more
successful investigations. As a result, the optimal leniency rate is the highest possible, in
our case full amnesty.
The natural question is then whether the AA can simultaneously improve cartel de-
terrence by properly designing the leniency scheme. In this respect, we first confirm the
advantage of restricting leniency to the first confessor, instead of granting leniency to all
informants. Then, we derive the optimal leniency scheme when the AA is allowed to offer
leniency rates contingent on the number of informants. The optimal scheme involves a
single informant rule, that is, amnesty should be given only if a unique cartel member
reports. When the AA adopts the single informant rule, amnesty is a lure, since all cartel
members face the same unilateral incentives to cheat on the cartel. One interesting di-
rection for future research would be to investigate the robustness of this single informant
rule, for instance when there is asymmetry between cartel members.
Appendix
Proof of lemma 1.
(i)
∂V
∂γ
=
φ2(σ, γ)(δ(Π
C −ΠCol)− (1− δ)(1− q)F )
(1− δ(1− φ(σ, γ)))2 < 0
(ii)
∂V
∂σ
=
φ1(σ, γ)(δ(Π
C −ΠCol)− (1− δ)(1− q)F )
(1− δ(1− φ(σ, γ)))2 ≤ 0
(iii)
∂V
∂q
=
φ(σ, γ)F
1− δ(1− φ(σ, γ)) > 0
Proof of proposition 2. We showed that σ just below σ∗(q) is optimal.
As σ∗(q) is increasing in q, desistance is optimized for q = 1. Let us show that V RFI(σ
∗(q), q) is
decreasing in q in order to prove that q = 1 is also optimal from a deterrence perspective.
After some straightforward manipulations, we can show that:
V RFI(σ
∗(q), q) = V R(σ∗(q), q)− φ(σ
∗(q), 1)N−1N q
1− δ + δφ(σ∗(q), 1)
Take q1 > q0. By definition, V
R(σ∗(q1), q1) = V R(σ∗(q0), q0). It follows that V RFI(σ
∗(q1), q1) <
V RFI(σ
∗(q0), q0) is equivalent to:
δφ(σ∗(q1), 1)φ(σ∗(q0), 1)(q0 − q1) < (1− δ)(φ(σ∗(q1), 1)q1 − φ(σ∗(q0), 1)q0)
The LHS is negative while the RHS is positive. Hence, V RFI(σ
∗(q), q) is decreasing in q. Q.E.D.
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